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Introduction'
The past decade has been heralded as one in which the movement for
greater governmental transparency has made substantial progress. In this
period, twenty-six nations have enacted legislation giving their citizens a
right of access to government information. 2 Supranational institutions are
said to have experienced their own "transparency revolution," 3 making
unprecedented commitments to disclose information.
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have been at the
forefront of this movement. Within a decade, at least ten nations in this
region have adopted national right-to-information laws, and several have
affirmed a right to information in their constitutions. In doing this, the
societies of Central and Eastern Europe have signaled their desire to repu-
diate a legacy of authoritarian government and emulate the democratic
practices of their Western European neighbors. Formal processes of Euro-
pean integration, such as the expansion of the European Union to include
many states in Central and Eastern Europe, may have encouraged efforts to
adopt westernized institutional arrangements, including right-to-informa-
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tion rules. 4
The process of European integration is also being expedited through
the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a collec-
tive security arrangement established in 1949 by western European states,
the United States and Canada. In March 1999, three CEE countries-
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic-became signatories to the North
Atlantic Treaty. Eight other CEE countries-Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Slovakia and Slovenia-were accepted as can-
didates for NATO membership in November 2002. These eight candidates
argue that integration into NATO will help to consolidate "the values of the
Euro-Atlantic community" throughout the region.5
TABLE ONE: RIGHT-TO-INFORMATION LAWS AND STATE SECRETS LAWS
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
6
NATO ACCESS TO
COUNTRY STATUS INFORMATION LAW STATE SECRETS LAW
Albania Candidate Law on the Right to Law on Creation and
Information for Official Control of Classified
Documents, 1999 Information, 1999
Bulgaria Candidate Access to Public Classified Information
Information Act, 2000 Protection Act, 2002
Czech 1999 Law on Free Access to Protection of Classified
Republic Information, 1999 Information Act, 1998
Estonia Candidate Public Information Act, State Secrets Act, 1999;
2000 amended, 2001
Hungary 1999 Act on the Protection of Act on State and Official
Personal Data and Disclo- Secrets, 1995; Amended
sure of Data of Public Inter- 1998
est, 1992
Latvia Candidate Law on Freedom of Law on State Secrets, 1997
Information, 1998
Lithuania Candidate Law on Provision of Infor- Law on State Secrets, 1995
mation to the Public, 2000
Macedonia Candidate None Not available
Poland 1999 Act on Access to Classified Information
Information, 2001 Protection Act, 1999
Romania Candidate Law Regarding Free Access Law on Protecting Classi-
to Information of Public fied Information, 2002
Interest, 2001
Slovakia Candidate Act on Free Access to Law on Protection of Classi-
Information, 2000 fied Information, 2001
Slovenia Candidate None Classified Information Act,
2001
4. Alex Grigorescu provides a more skeptical view about the influence of institu-
tions such as the European Union and the Council of Europe on the diffusion of trans-
parency norms. Alex Grigorescu, European institutions and unsuccessful norm
transmission: The case of transparency, 39.4 INTERNATIONAL POLITICs 467-89 (2002).
5. NATO Candidates, Vilnius Statement. Vilnius, Lithuania. May 19, 2000.
6. The main source for this table is DAVID BANiSAR, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND
ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT RECORDS AROUND THE WORLD. London: Privacy International.
July 2002.
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Although integration into NATO promises larger benefits, it has also
presented proponents of democratization with unexpected challenges.
NATO has made clear that admission depends on the ability of nations to
establish "sufficient safeguards and procedures to ensure the security of
the most sensitive information as laid down in NATO security policy.' '7
One result has been the rapid diffusion of state secrecy laws throughout
the region (Table One). The eleven countries that have recently joined
NATO, or wish to join, have been candid in explaining that these laws have
been adopted to satisfy NATO requirements.8 New state secrecy laws have
been accompanied by less obvious changes in internal policies and prac-
tices intended to regulate the flow of sensitive information.
These initiatives have provoked anxiety and vigorous protest in several
CEE countries. 9 The establishment of new national security authorities
and rigorous personnel clearance procedures sits uneasily within societies
that have only recently dismantled state security agencies and the inform-
ant networks upon which they relied. Broad definitions of state secrets,
and the threat of penalties for unauthorized disclosure of state secrets,
seem to undermine the effort at building more open government, and clash
7. NATO, Press Release NAC-S(99)66: Membership Action Plan (April 24, 1999).
8. For recent comments from Albania, see, Albania Ministry of Defense, Restructur-
ing of the Armed Forces 2002-2010 (2002) at http://www.mod.gov.al/anglisht/AntNATO_
Angl/AntNATOlink3.htm, (last visited August, 2002). For Bulgaria, see, Ulrich Buech-
senschuetz, Bulgaria's New Law on Classified Information, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIB-
ERTY NEWSLINE, PRAGUE, April 30, 2002. For Slovakia, see, Peter Sobcak and Roman
Kment, Protecting Classified Information, SLOVAK ARMY REV. SPRING 2002 WEB EDITION
(2002) at http://www.defense.gov.sk/e-ziny/sar/2002_spring/O1.html (last visited
August, 2002).
9. In 1999, Poland's ombudsman questioned the constitutionality of rules in the
country's new Classified Information Act that determined which public officials would
receive access to sensitive information. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee complained
that Hungary's state secrets law, first adopted in 1995, became problematic after the
addition of "extremely vague wording" about classification of information in December
1999. See, International Helsinki Federation, Human rights in the OSCE region: Report
2000. Vienna: International Helsinki Foundation. June 2000: 185, 286; International
Helsinki Federation, Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Report 2001. Vienna: Interna-
tional Helsinki Federation, May 2001: 240. In Slovakia, protests from non-governmental
organizations compelled the Cabinet to withdraw a proposed secrecy law in February
2001. See Grigorescu supra note 4. A law was eventually adopted in May 2001. ARTI-
CLE 19, a freedom of expression advocacy group, complained about "absurdly broad"
restrictions in the proposed Bulgarian secrecy law. See, ARTICLE 19, Memorandum on
the Bulgarian Law on the Protection of Classified Information. London: ARTICLE 19.
October 2001. In May 2002, a cross-party coalition of legislators launched a court chal-
lenge claiming that the law conflicted with Bulgaria's constitutional guarantee of a right
to information. See, Opposition Appeals to Constitutional Court Over Law on Classified
Information, RADio FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, May 30, 2002. The first ver-
sion of Romania's state secrets law was struck down on procedural grounds by
Romania's Constitutional Court in April 2001. The International Helsinki Federation
said that the second draft of the law "failed to strike a proper balance" between secrecy
and the public's right to know. See, International Helsinki Federation, Human Rights in
the OSCE Region: Report 2002. Vienna: International Helsinki Federation. May 2002:
257. ARTICLE 19 said that "incredibly broad" restrictions in the law could "substan-
tially undermine" Romania's new right-to-information statute. See, ARTICLE 19, Memo-
randum on the Romanian Law for the Protection of Classified Information. London:
ARTICLE 19. April 11, 2002: 2, 8.
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with constitutional or statutory guarantees on transparency. Debate has
been soured by some CEE governments' insistence on quick action to meet
NATO deadlines, 10 and by NATO's own refusal to publish the requirements
that it expects candidate nations to fulfill.
Concerns about the impact of NATO's security of information (SOI)
requirements are justified. Although NATO's policy remains inaccessible,
its broad outlines can be deduced. It is a conservative policy, largely
crafted at a time when the western powers were faced with overwhelming
military threats and non-state actors played a much smaller role in the pro-
cess of governance. Archival records show that the original signatories
went through a similar process of policy rationalization and articulated
concerns comparable to those being expressed by critics today. In fact,
NATO's SOI policy continues to play an important role in frustrating the
work of transparency advocates in Western Europe and North America,
some of who may be unaware of the role that is played by NATO and other
similar SOI agreements.
European nations are caught in an increasingly dense web of multilat-
eral commitments on the handling of information, based largely on the
conservative policy crafted by the North Atlantic Treaty countries in the
early years of the Cold War. There is good reason to think that the same
may be said of countries in other parts of the globe. This may give us
reason to be cautious in assuming that global integration is favorable to
increased transparency. Advocates of transparency will also find that
domestic policy on matters of state secrecy is increasingly constrained by
this thickening web of agreements on security of information.
I. What Does NATO Require?
Governments throughout Central and Eastern Europe have said that their
legislation is tailored to suit NATO requirements.11 However, observers
have asked whether governments in the region are using the process of
NATO expansion as a pretext for adopting unnecessarily broad laws, or
whether NATO's SOI policy is itself unduly tilted against transparency.
These are reasonable questions, but NATO has done little to provide
answers. Its SOI policy is not publicly accessible. However, available evi-
10. A Romanian newspaper reported in April 2002: "On Wednesday [April 3] a cer-
tain Colonel Constantin Raicu of the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service], who is in
charge of the protection of state secrets, came down like a storm on the members of the
Senate Juridical Commission, telling them: 'This morning we have received signals from
Brussels indicating that if the bill on classified information is not passed before 16
April, they cannot exclude adopting a critical attitude regarding Romania. We agree with
any form-the colonel added-but please, pass it as soon as possible, or we will be facing
huge problems'." NATO Used as Scarecrow to Pass Law on Secrets, BUCHAREST ZIUA,
INTERNET EDFFION, April 8, 2002, at http://www.ziua.net/.
11. It is reported that Bulgaria's foreign minister defended the country's proposed
state secrets law by saying that NATO experts had described it as one of the best statutes
of its type among all NATO applicant countries. See, Bulgarian Parliament Starts Vote on
Classified Information Protection Law, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY NEWSLINE, April
18, 2002.
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dence does suggest that the policy, crafted in the early years of the Cold
War, is excessively tilted toward secrecy.
For most of NATO's history, its SOI policy was contained in a docu-
ment known as C-M(55)15(Final), Security within the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. This document had three components. The first and oldest
component was a Security Agreement adopted by parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty at the third meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Janu-
ary 1950, as one of the basic components of NATO's "master Defense
Plan."' 2 This became Enclosure "A" of C-M(55)15(Final). A second com-
ponent, first adopted in 1950 but substantially revised over the next five
years, outlined detailed security procedures for the protection of NATO
classified information. This became Enclosure "C" of C-M(55)15(Final). A
third component, adopted for the first time in 1955, had a broader reach.
It outlined "basic principles and minimum standards" that were to govern
the overall design of national security systems. This affected the handling
of all sensitive information, whether produced by NATO or not. This
became Enclosure "B" of C-M(55)15(Final) (See Table 2).
TABLE TWO: COMPONENTS OF NATO'S SECURITY WITHIN THE NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
C-M(2002)49
C-M(55)15(Final)t (June 2002)
Enclosure "A" Security Agreement Security Agreement
Enclosure "B" Basic Principles and Minimum Basic Principles
Standards of Security
Enclosure "C" Security Procedures for Protection of Personnel Security
NATO classified information
Enclosure "D" Industrial Security Physical Security
Enclosure "E" Protection Measures against Terrorist Security of Information
Threatst!
Enclosure "F" INFOSEC t tt
t Titles for Enclosures "A" to "D" are based on the version of C-M(55)15(Final) issued
in July 1964.
tT This title is based on information in Canadian government documents released in
response to an Access to Information Act request. Apparently revised in March 2002.
ttt INFOSEC relates to the identification and application of security measures to
protect information processed, stored or transmitted in communication, information and
other electronic systems.
A document which compiled these three components was approved by
the North Atlantic Council in March 1955, and given the designation C-
M(55)15(Final). The SOI policy was substantially revised in later years,
although it retained this designation. Enclosure "D," providing guidance
on information given to defense contractors, was added in 1958. A Confi-
12. See NATO, Summary Record of the Third Session of the North Atlantic Council
held in Washington, January 6, 1950. Brussels: NATO Archives. C3-R/1. The phrase is
President Truman's. See LORD ISMAY, NATO: THE FIRST FivE YEARS 27 (1955).
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dential Supplement was added in 1961 that provided additional guidance
on methods of personnel screening. Enclosure "E," which addressed anti-
terrorism efforts, was added in the early 1980s, and apparently revised in
early 2002.
The strictness of NATO's SOI policy may be illustrated by its treatment
of the policy itself. The fact that NATO had adopted a SOI agreement was
not acknowledged in the final communique of the January 1950 meeting of
the Council. 13 Although C-M(55)15(Final) was for many years an unclassi-
fied document, NATO refused for decades to make it publicly available. 14
A narrow glimpse of NATO policy may have been provided in 1998, when a
revised version of the Security Agreement (which apparently still consti-
tutes Enclosure A of the policy) was made publicly available by some
NATO member states. 15 Versions of C-M(55)15(Final) adopted before
1964 have also been made available in the NATO Archives.
Nevertheless, the complete and current version of C-M(55)15(Final)
always remained inaccessible. The policy reminded national governments
that documents such as C-M(55)15(Final) are the property of NATO, and
may not be given to any other individual or organization without NATO's
consent. As a consequence, several governments recently refused requests
made under national right to information laws for copies of the policy.1 6
NATO's Security Office, responding to one of these requests, explained in
February 2002 that:
NATO unclassified information . . . can only be used for official purposes.
Only individuals, bodies or organizations that require it for official NATO
purposes may have access to it ... NATO information marked in this man-
ner is subject to release via agreement from its originators and subject to
recognized storage procedures for its protection. 17
NATO began an overhaul of C-M(55)15(Final) in the late 1990s. The
review, guided by an Ad-Hoc Working Group for the Fundamental Review
for NATO Security Policy, was completed in early 2002. A revised SOI pol-
icy, now known as C-M(2002)49, was adopted by NATO on June 17, 2002.
13 LORD ISMAY, NATO: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 181 (1955).
14, The document was originally classified as RESTRICTED. It was declassified
sometime after 1964. However, NATO does not consider that all unclassified documents
should necessarily be accessible to the public. See NATO, Publication Policy. AC/323-
D/22, March 2001, Annex VIF.
15. The Canadian Government published the revised agreement in 1998. CAN. T.S.
1998/56.
16. The author made a request for C-M(55)15(Final) to the Canadian Department of
National Defence in September 2001, which was declined. Comparable requests were
made by the National Security Archive to the U.S. Department of Defense; and by the
Campaign for Freedom of Information to the U.K. Ministry of Defence. Mr. Ulf Oberg,
Faculty of Law, Stockholm University, made the same request to the Swedish Ministry of
Defence.
17. Letter from Wayne Rychak, Director, NATO Office of Security, to Jacob Visscher,
General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. February 6, 2002. Available
from the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. Emphasis in origi-
nal. This letter was written in response to a request for C-M(55)15(Final) made to the
Council of the European Union by Mr. Ulf Oberg.
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The Working Group completed its work in secrecy, and the new policy
remains inaccessible to the public 18 , although its broad outlines may be
reconstructed from other sources (Table 2).
NATO's reticence means that an assessment of its SOI policy must be
largely speculative. Nevertheless it is possible to describe the policy in
broad terms, drawing on NATO's archival documentst 9 and other sources,
such as the language of the CEE's new state secrecy laws.
Another of these sources is the SOI policy of a related collective secur-
ity pact, the Western European Union (WEU). Established by the Brussels
Treaty of March 1948, the WEU actually served as the foundation for the
broader alliance established by the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949.20
There is good reason to believe that the two pacts maintained comparable
security policies. Policymakers within NATO acknowledged that the first
drafts of its security policy were based on the WEU's policy. 2 1 All ten of
the nations that are currently members of WEU are also members of
NATO; in addition, there is a NATO-WEU SOI agreement, signed in 1992.
An early version of NATO policy recognized that NATO and WEU materials
might be "co-mingled" in the same administrative processes. 22
Fortunately, the WEU's security policy is publicly accessible. The
government of Sweden signed the WEU security agreement, and became
responsible for complying with its security regulations, as a precondition
for entering into cooperation on certain issues with the WEU in 1992. The
Swedish government released the WEU security agreement and the 1996
version of the WEU security regulations in February 2002 in response to a
request under Sweden's Freedom of the Press Act.2 3
Another view of NATO policy may be provided by bilateral agreements
that are publicly accessible. The Council of the European Union recently
released correspondence in 2001 between its Secretary General, Javier
Solana, and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, which outlined an
interim security agreement that serves as a foundation for closer coopera-
tion between the two organizations. 2 4 The Council of the European Union
subsequently adopted security regulations that must be presumed to con-
18. The existence of the Working Group was acknowledged in Canadian government
documents released to the author in response to a request under Canada's Access to
Information Act in September 2002.
19. The policy on access to archival materials can be found at http://www.nato.int/
archives/policy.htm.
20. Until 1954, the Western European Union was known as the Western Union.
21. NATO Standing Group, Record of Meeting of the Standing Group of the North
Atlantic Military Committee. Brussels: NATO Archives. November 18, 1949. SG 7.
22. NATO, Revision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security System, as
approved by Council Deputies. Brussels: NATO Archives. March 19, 1952. DC 2/7
(Final): Annex B, cl 3.
23. These documents were released in response to a request to the Swedish govern-
ment made by Mr. Ulf Oberg. Western European Union, Security Regulations. January
1996. RS 100: § 11.8, 11.9.
24. These documents were also released by the Secretariat General of the Council of
the European Union in response to a request by Mr. Ulf Oberg.
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form to NATO requirements. 25
From all this, what can be said about NATO's SOI policy? That it has
five basic features, each of which has been adopted with the aim of ensur-
ing a high level of security for information. The cumulative effect of the
rules is to put an extraordinary emphasis on control of information.
Breadth. The first of these elements might be called the principle of
breadth, although this term is not used in NATO documents. It implies
that the rules that a member state adopts regarding security of information
should govern all kinds of sensitive information, in all parts of govern-
ment. It eschews narrower approaches, perhaps limited to information
received through NATO, or information held within military or intelligence
institutions. Laws adopted by several CEE countries have this comprehen-
sive quality. The principle is expressed in the 1964 edition of C-
M(55)15(Final), which articulates standards for information security that
apply to all sectors of government, on the grounds that member states must
be assured that each country gives "a common standard of protection... to
the secrets in which all have a common interest. ' 26
Depth. The next principle underpinning NATO policy is that of depth
of coverage, although again the rule is not expressed in this way in NATO
documents. The policy errs on the side of caution when determining what
information should be covered by an SO policy. This is evident in the
NATO classification policy, whose lowest category, RESTRICTED, applies
to information whose relevance to security is negligible. Information may
be classified at this level if its disclosure would be "undesirable to the inter-
est of NATO."'2 7 Several CEE countries have adopted equally broad classifi-
cations for the whole of government. Under Czech law, for example,
information is classified as RESTRICTED if disclosure would be unfavora-
ble to the Republic;28 in Slovenia, information is RESTRICTED if disclosure
could harm the activity or performance of tasks of an agency. 29
Centralization. A third principle of NATO policy is that of centraliza-
tion. This has a national and intergovernmental aspect. At the national
level, centralization of responsibility and strong coordination are regarded
as "the foundations of sound national security."30 Member states are
25. Council of the European Union, Council Decision Adopting Council's Security
Regulations, 2001/264/EC. March 19, 2001.
26. NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO
Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Enc. B, C11.
27. NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO
Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Enc. C, § II. A compara-
ble description of NATO's classification policy can be found in a recent and publicly
accessible document: NATO (2001). Publication Policy. Brussels: NATO. March 2001.
AC/323-D/22: Annex VIF. The WEU adopts an equally expansive policy: information
must be classified as RESTRICTED if its disclosure "would be disadvantageous to the
interests of WEU." Western European Union, Security Regulations. January 1996. RS
100: § II.
28. Protection of Classified Information Act, 1998, section 5(5).
29. Classified Information Act, article 13.
30. NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO
Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Encl. B, '1 3.
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expected to establish a "national security organization" (NSO) that is
responsible for the security of NATO information and screening of person-
nel; for "the collection and recording of intelligence regarding espionage,
sabotage and subversion"; and for advice to government on threats to
security and appropriate responses. 3 t Presumably the NSO is also respon-
sible for leading the "high-level" system of inter-departmental coordination
that is required to ensure tight integration of departmental policies and
procedures. 3 2 The NSO must also have the authority needed to conduct
inspections of security arrangements for the protection of NATO informa-
tion within other departments and agencies, and to investigate and
respond to breaches of security. 3 3
This structure is roughly replicated at the intergovernmental level. In
1955 the North Atlantic Council gave its Security Bureau the responsibility
for "overall coordination" of security in NATO. The Bureau, now renamed
as the NATO Office of Security, advises national authorities on the applica-
tion of principles and standards, and carries out surveillance of national
systems to ensure that NATO information is adequately protected. 34
National authorities have an obligation to report possible breaches of
security to the NATO office, which in turn must "coordinate with national
authorities" in investigations. 35
Controlled distribution. The NATO security policy invokes two rules
that are intended to strictly control the distribution of information. The
first of these is "the NEED TO KNOW principle": that individuals should
have access to classified information only when they need the information
for their work, and access should never be authorized "merely because a
person occupies a particular position, however senior."'36 This is regarded
as a "fundamental principle" of security. Judgments about whether an
individual has a "need to know" are made by the originator of the docu-
3 1. NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO
Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Encl. B, c1 3; Encl. C, § I,
1 15.
32. NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO
Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Encl. B, 3 7.
33. NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO
Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Encl. C, § 1, C1315(c) and
§ IX, 33 3-5. Comparable provisions can be found in WEU security regulations. West-
ern European Union, Security Regulations. January 1996. RS 100: § I, 3 12; § IX, ' 5.
34. NATO documents refer to periodic inspections of national systems. "Surveil-
lance" is the term used to describe comparable oversight arrangements in other multilat-
eral agreements, such as the Article IV consultations undertaken by the International
Monetary Fund, and the trade policy reviews undertaken by the World Trade
Organization.
35. NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO
Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Encl. C, § 1, 3 3 and § IX
c 4. Comparable provisions can be found in WEU security regulations: Security Regula-
tions. January 1996. RS 100 § I, 3cl 14-15; § IX, 3cl 6-8.
36. NATO Security Committee, A Short Guide to the Handling of Classified Informa-
tion. Brussels: NATO Archives. August 22, 1958. AC/35-WP/14: 4. Emphasis in
original.
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ment, or by one of the addressees identified by the originator. 37
The second rule that restricts the distribution of information might be
called the principle of originator control. The principle acknowledges the
right of member states, and NATO itself, to set firm limits on the distribu-
tion of information that is circulated among member states. The principle
was central to the agreement signed by NATO members in January 1950,
which stipulated that:
The parties to the North Atlantic Treaty ... will make every effort to ensure
that they will maintain the security classifications established by any party
with respect to the information of that party's origin; will safeguard accord-
ingly such information; ... and will not disclose such information to
another nation without the consent of the originator.3 8
The principle of originator control trumps the "need-to-know" princi-
ple, since originators may impose a high level of classification that restricts
the number of individuals to whom the document might be referred by an
addressee. Nor may a document be downgraded or declassified without
the consent of its originator. 39 The principle is even stricter with regard to
distribution of documents outside the community of NATO governments.
In this case, distribution is absolutely prohibited without consent, even if
the information is graded as UNCLASSIFIED. In these circumstances, the
information is regarded as "the property of the originator," which retains
absolute control over its distribution.40
Personnel controls. The fifth and final element of the NATO security
policy comprises strict rules regarding the selection of individuals who are
entitled to view classified information. The precise requirements for per-
sonnel screening are not easy to discern. Some of the exact criteria
adopted during the Cold War are probably no longer applicable; and some
37. NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO
Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Enc. B, Introduction, 'l
5(d); § VI, [ 6-7; § VIII, TI 4-5. See also Western European Union, Security Regula-
tions, January 1996. RS 100: Preface, cl 7(d); § VI, ch. 1, c 4-6.
38. NATO, Security System for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels:
NATO Archives. December 1, 1949. DC 2/1: 4. The same language may be found in
Sweden's agreement with the WEU (Security Agreement between Sweden and Western
European Union. Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs. March 18, 1997: Art. 1); in
Poland's agreement with NATO (National Security Bureau, Agreement Between the Par-
ties to the North Atlantic Treaty for the Security of Information. Warsaw: National Secur-
ity Bureau, Government of Poland. 1999); and in the interim security agreement
between the European Union and NATO (Letter from Lord Robertson, Secretary General
of NATO, to Javier Solana, Secretary General of the Council of the European Union on
NATO-EU Interim Security Agreements. July 26, 2000. Available from the General Sec-
retariat of the Council of the European Union).
39. NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO
Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Enc. C, § V.
40. The phrase is taken from NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Brussels: NATO Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-M(55)15(Final)(Ed
1964): Enc. C, Introduction. The rule is restated in Enc. C, § 1I T18-9. For WEU policy,
see Security Regulations. January 1906. RS 100: § III, '1 2, and § XII.
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of the criteria used in NATO's early years were still withheld in late 2002.4
The policy relies on a system of "positive vetting," in which individuals
who handle sensitive information are subjected to active background inves-
tigation before receiving clearance. 42 NATO's early policy made clear that
decisions could be based on assessments of character and lifestyle, and
that the evidentiary threshold for denying clearances was low. Individuals
were expected to demonstrate "unquestioned loyalty [and] such character,
habits, associates and discretion as to cast no doubt upon their
trustworthiness.
'
"
43
Evidence that these rigorous standards are still applied can be found
in CEE countries. Slovakia's new security agency recently stated that it will
review political and religious affiliations, as well as lifestyles-including
extramarital affairs-that are thought to create a danger of blackmail.4 4
The Associated Press reported that Romania intends to deny clearances to
security staff with "anti-western attitudes. '4 5 A constitutional challenge to
Poland's Classified Information Act by Polish judges was also motivated by
their concern about intrusive investigations to determine whether their
lifestyles could make them "susceptible to ... pressure. '4 6
Other controls are imposed to control personnel after a clearance has
been provided. The 1964 edition of C-M(55)15(Final) stipulated that
supervisors had a duty "of recording and reporting any incidents, associa-
tions or habits likely to have a bearing on security." Evidence that created
a "reasonable doubt" about loyalty or trustworthiness required the removal
of a security clearance. 4 7 Finally, there was an expectation that "discipli-
nary action" would be taken against individuals who are responsible for
the unauthorized disclosure of information. 48 Additionally, as demon-
strated later in this article, there appeared to be an expectation that mem-
ber states would establish clear criminal penalties for unauthorized
disclosure.
41. These were contained in a Confidential Supplement that was added to C-
M(55)15(Final) in January, 1961. Clearance criteria for the WEU do not appear to be
contained in its security regulations.
42. The 1964 policy observes that "fullest practicable use should be made of the
technique of background investigation." NATO, Security within the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-
M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Encl. B, 1 9.
43. NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO
Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Encl. B, 1 9.
44. Peter Sobcak and Roman Kment, Protecting Classified Information, SLOVAK ARMY
REV. SPRING 2002 WEB EDITION (2002) at http://www.defense.gov.sk/e-ziny/sar/2002_
spring/01.html (last visited August, 2002).
45. NATO Officials Want Romania to Exclude Some Former Communists From Intelli-
gence Positions, ASSOcIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, March 20, 2002.
46. Polish Judges Under Secret Service Surveillance, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY
NEWSLINE, August 11, 2000.
47. NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO
Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Enc. B, 9IC1 11, 15.
48. NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO
Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Encl. C, § IX, c9 10. See
also Western European Union, Security Regulations, January 1996, RS 100: § IX, 10.
Cornell International Law Journal
II. Echoes of Earlier Debates
Observers in the CEE countries are probably right in seeing a clash
between NATO security requirements and national policies on the right to
information. There is a fundamental conflict with the principle under gird-
ing transparency laws: that information held by government should be
generally accessible, subject to a few narrowly defined exceptions. More
concretely, there are several ways in which NATO policy appears to clash
with the Johannesburg Principles, a set of rules regarding the balance to be
struck between national security and transparency developed by a group of
experts convened by ARTICLE 19, a freedom of expression advocacy
organization, in 1995. 4 9
In fact, contemporary debate in CEE countries echoes earlier disagree-
ments among the first signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty. Archival
records show that the early evolution of the policy was marked by clear
divergences among governments about the balance to be struck between
security and transparency. In the end, the balance was tipped toward
security-the understandable result of a policy process dominated by mili-
tary leaders, undertaken in secrecy, and in the context of immense threats
to collective security.
Military influence over security policy. In NATO's first three years, a
body known as the Standing Group held sole responsibility for security
policy. The Standing Group crafted the first NATO security policy, DC 2/
1, approved by the North Atlantic Council in January 1950, and conducted
the first field inspections of security practices of each member state to
ensure compliance with NATO policy.
Formally, the Standing Group was a subcommittee of the Military
Committee, which consisted of the Chiefs-of-Staff of all member countries
and was "the supreme military authority" within NATO. 50 The Standing
Group had only three members, representing the Chiefs-of-Staff of the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France. In practice, however, the
Standing Group dominated the Military Committee. A chairman of the
Military Committee observed: "The Standing Group ... did not in practice
'assist' the Military Committee as discharge its functions almost entirely.
All of the day-to-day business was done and all the day-to-day decisions
were taken by this Group."' 5 1 There were inequalities within the Standing
Group as well. British and American officers believed that the French
49. The Johannesburg Principles are provided in SANDRA COLIVER ET AL., SECRECY AND
LIBERTY: NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION 1-10
(1999). NATO policy appears to permit the categorical denial of public access to infor-
mation, regardless of importance, in violation of Principle 12; and punishment for unau-
thorized disclosure of information, without regard to harm or benefit from disclosure, in
violation of Principle 15. It may also encourage the denial of employment based on
opinion or beliefs, or denial of due process in removal, in violation of Principles 5 and
20.
50. LORD ISMAY, NATO: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 68 (1955).
51. SIR PETER HItL-NORTON, No SOFT OPTIONS: THE POLITICO-MILITARY REALITIES OF
NATO 7 (1978).
Vol. 36
2003 Entangling Alliances
armed services was riddled with Communist sympathizers 52 and often dis-
cussed security matters on a bilateral basis.
The Group's preeminence was at first understandable, given the mili-
tary weakness of the other allies and the extraordinary threats that con-
fronted the Alliance in its first years. 5 3 Nonethless, its power was "if not
mildly resented, then certainly a cause for muttering."5 4
Complaints about the Standing Group had two distinct dimensions.
The first related to the disproportionate influence of the "Anglo-Saxons"
and the exclusion of the nine other signatories of the North Atlantic
Treaty. 5 5 Based in the Pentagon, the Standing Group refused to distribute
the agendas or minutes of its meetings to the representatives of the other
nine governments. 56 The Standing Group's attitude toward these other
states was illustrated by its approach to field inspections of national secur-
ity practices. All of the excluded states were inspected first, while the
Standing Group's member states were inspected last.57 The British Secur-
ity Service, M15, conducted these inspections on behalf of the Standing
Group. 58
A second concern was the dominant role played by the military in
setting security policy. It soon became clear that NATO would serve as a
vehicle for the coordination of political and economic questions, as well as
military affairs.5 9 This implied a growing volume of communications
between foreign and finance ministries, all undertaken under restrictive
rules set by military staff. Non-military staff within the NATO secretariat
itself also complained about the rigid rules that the Standing Group had
imposed regarding the dissemination of information, about its unwilling-
52. RICHARD ALDRICH, THE HIDDEN HAND: BRITAIN, AMERICA AND COLD WAR SECRET
INTELLIGENCE 145 (2002).
53. In 1947 Hungary, Romania and Poland ceased to have non-communists in their
governments. Czechoslovakia experienced a communist coup in February 1948, and the
Soviet Union attempted to blockade West Berlin. North Korea invaded South Korea in
June 1950. J.M. ROBERTS, THE PENGUIN HISTORY OF EUROPE 595, 599 (1997).
54. SIR PETER HILL-NORTON, No SOFT OPTIONS: THE POITICO-MILITARY REALITIES OF
NATO 7 (1978).
55. PETER DUIGNAN, NATO: ITS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 11 (2000). There were
eleven other signatories after the accession of Greece and Turkey in October 1951.
56. DOUGLAS BLAND, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALl lANCE 142-
43 (1991).
57. With one exception: Canada was also one of the last countries to be inspected.
The order of inspections is provided in NATO Security Coordinating Committee, Report
by the Security Coordinating Committee to the Standing Group on the proposed exami-
nation of the functioning of the NATO security system in the United States, Canada
United Kingdom and France. Brussels: NATO Archives. July 27, 1951. SG 7/42.
58. NATO Standing Group, Memorandum by Standing Group on Implementation of
NATO Security System December 12, 1949. Brussels: NATO Archives. December 12,
1949. DCM-13-49; RICHARD ALDRICH, THE HIDDEN HAND: BRITAIN, AMERICA AND COLD
WAR SECRET INTELILGENCE 429-30 (2002).
59. The importance of NATO's work in non-military fields was later emphasized by
the 1956 Report on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO. See, SIR PETER HIL-NORTON,
No SOFT OPTIONS: THE POLITICO-MILITARY REALITIES OF NATO 9 (1978).
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ness to acknowledge the authority of civilian officials within NATO, 60 and
about its secretiveness. "Never in all the positions I have held," said Lord
Ismay, who as Secretary General served as the head of NATO's non-mili-
tary staff, "have I felt so much in the dark."6 1
Complaints about the Standing Group's role increased when it began
an overhaul of DC 2/1 in early 1951. Its draft of a new security policy
seemed to affirm-and perhaps strengthen-the Standing Group's pow-
ers.6 2 In response, the Canadian government submitted a proposal to
include military representatives from all twelve countries on the Security
Coordinating Committee, which had been established by the Standing
Group in January 1950 to specialize in security matters. 6 3 The Belgian
government went further. It was unacceptable, said Belgium, that SO pol-
icy should be set by a body representing three nations, and "exclusively
military in character":
It is therefore necessary to find a way of... restoring to the civilian side its
proper share in Security matters.... It is out of the question that [the North
Atlantic Council] should be subject, in this connexion, to the decisions of
the Standing Group, especially in view of the fact .. that the secrets which
have to be kept are not only military, but also political and economic secrets.
The solution, Belgium suggested, was the creation of a new security
committee that would include civilian as well as military representatives,
and be responsible directly to the Council, rather than NATO's Military
Committee. 64
The Standing Group dismissed the Canadian and Belgian proposals as
unnecessary and impractical. 6 5 This reflected a more general concern on
the part of the Standing Group that reforms aimed at enlarging the influ-
ence of other countries would undermine its efficiency. 6 6 Nevertheless,
one of its members recognized that complete obduracy was unlikely to be
effective in preserving the Standing Group's influence.
60. DOUGI.As BLAND, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALl lANCE 148
(1991).
61. ROBERT JORDAN, THE NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF/SECRETARIAT 179 (1967).
62. On the effect that the proposed new policy would have on the authority of the
Standing Group, see the brief submitted by the Belgian government in June 1951:
Belgium, Memorandum by the Belgian Government to the Working Group on NATO
Security. Brussels: NATO Archives. July 1951. AC/6-D/3.
63. NATO Standing Group, Monthly summary of activities of the Standing Group,
December 1949 to January. Brussels: NATO Archives. January 11, 1950. SG 5/1: 6;
NATO Standing Group, Note by the Secretaries to the Standing Group on Terms of Refer-
ence for the Security Coordinating Committee. Brussels: NATO Archives. April 6, 1951.
SG 41/2: 2.
64. Belgium, Memorandum by the Belgian Government to the Working Group on NATO
Security. Brussels: NATO Archives. July 1951. AC/6-D/3.
65. NATO Security Coordinating Committee, Report of the Security Coordinating
Committee to the Standing Group. Brussels: NATO Archives. June 21, 1951. AC/6-D/4;
NATO Standing Group, Note by the Secretaries to the Standing Group on Terms of Refer-
ence for the Security Coordinating Committee. Brussels: NATO Archives. April 6, 1951.
SG 41/2: 2.
66. DOUGLAs BLAND, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLI ANCE 151-
55 (1991).
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The United Kingdom therefore put forward a compromise proposal.
The Standing Group's Security Coordinating Committee would establish a
subcommittee of civilian and military representatives from other European
states that could advise on problems referred to it by the Security Coordi-
nating Committee. 6 7 The proposed European Security Committee would
operate "on an equal level" with the Security Coordinating Committee on
non-military matters, and the Council would arbitrate if the Standing
Group's Security Coordinating Committee could not accept its
recommendations. 6 8
This proved unacceptable to the United States. As a consequence, the
next revision of the British proposal reduced the proposed European Secur-
ity Committee to an arm of the Security Coordinating Committee, which
would retain all authority on security matters. 69 Meanwhile, France
offered an even more modest concession: two representatives of NATO's
civilian agencies would be permitted to join the Security Coordinating
Committee whenever a revision of security policy was contemplated or
inspections of civilian agencies were undertaken. 70
A deadlock among NATO governments persisted for a year. A Stand-
ing Group official wrote in March 1952 that
[T]here is still a diversity of views on this matter. All are apparently agreed
that Security is indivisible, but the first divergence comes from those who
consider it indivisibly a civil responsibility and those who consider it indi-
visibly military. There is a further minor divergence produced by members
who, though willing to admit that Security may be a military responsibility
in certain countries, are loath to see a top-level security body . . containing
any military representatives .... There is also the feeling that the highest
technical body responsible for security should be more representative than
the [Security Coordinating Committee] and should include at least some
civil representation.
The official warned the Standing Group to ensure that "that the Mili-
tary view received due consideration" in the final resolution of the
debate. 7'
The impasse appeared to be broken in May 1952. A Working Group
on NATO Security finally proposed the establishment of a new Security
Committee consisting of civilian or military representatives of all member
countries, and supported by a new Security Bureau. The Standing Group's
role would be reduced to the implementation of security policy within the
67. United Kingdom, Proposal by the United Kingdom to the Working Group on
NATO security. Brussels: NATO Archives. July 2, 1951. AC/6-D/5: 1.
68. Working Group on NATO Security, Draft terms of reference for the proposed
European Security Co-ordinating Committee. Brussels: NATO Archives. July 21, 1951.
AC/6-D/6: 2.
69. Working Group on NATO Security, Revised Draft Terms of Reference for the
Proposed European Security Co-Ordinating Committee. Brussels: NATO Archives. Octo-
ber 6, 1951. AC/6-D/7.
70. France, Proposal by the French government to the Working Group on NATO
Security. Brussels: NATO Archives. July 26, 1951. AC/6-D/8.
71. NATO Standing Group, Memorandum by Standing Group for the Chairman on
NATO Security System. Brussels: NATO Archives. March 22, 1952. SGM-713-52: 3.
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military sphere, although it would retain the right to send recommenda-
tions for changes in security policy directly to the Council.7 2 The Standing
Group, although still dubious about the merits of the proposal, neverthe-
less yielded, and the Council adopted the new structure in August 1952. 7 3
Controversy over breadth of NATO policy. Within months, however, the
Standing Group demonstrated that it still held a dominant role in the for-
mulation of SO policy. Between 1953 and 1955, it was the principal advo-
cate for a policy overhaul that significantly expanded the breadth of
NATO's influence over the practices of member states-but not without
objection by some governments.
Concern about the breadth of NATO's SOI rules had been expressed
since the adoption of the organization's first policy, DC 2/1, in January
1950. One of the main innovations of DC 2/1 was the establishment of the
COSMIC security system. Documents flowing through the NATO appara-
tus were to be given a COSMIC marking, in addition to a security grad-
ing. 74 The distribution of COSMIC documents was to be carefully
managed. They were to be sent only by cipher machines or in accompa-
nied bags, and sealed in double envelopes to prevent unauthorized inspec-
tion. Each government was to establish a central registry to manage the
flow of COSMIC documents, as well as sub-registries in each department.
Receipts were to be issued whenever documents changed hands so that the
registry could trace distribution. Only personnel with COSMIC authoriza-
tion were permitted to view COSMIC documents. 75
Within months of its adoption, the COSMIC system proved unwork-
able. The problem, said NATO's Secretary General, was "that too many
papers were being called COSMIC and the result was that nobody could
take any papers to study them anywhere, and it was thought to be too
72. Working Group on NATO Security, Memorandum by Working Group on NATO
Security on Proposed NATO Security Committee. Brussels: NATO Archives. May 28,
1952. AC/6-D/13.
73. North Atlantic Council, Summary record of meeting of the Council on August
20, 1952. Brussels: NATO Archives. C-R(52)18. As late as April 1952, the Standing
Group continued to insist that it should have sole responsibility for security policy.
NATO Standing Group, Report by the Security Coordinating Committee to the Standing
Group on establishment of a European Security Committee. Brussels: NATO Archives.
April 9, 1952. SG 7/50: 2. Nevertheless, it recognized the probability that a larger, all-
nations committee would be formed. Fears about the workability of this larger commit-
tee led the Standing Group to suggest that the new Security Bureau should report to the
Secretary General rather than this new committee. The Working Group accepted this
proposal, but the Council rejected it, and made the Security Bureau responsible to the
new NATO Security Committee. A British official said privately that "this was palpably
a further effort on the part of the Americans to build up the Secretariat at the expense of
the committees on which national Delegations were represented." Foreign Office, Mem-
orandum on Meeting of Working Group on NATO Security. May 23, 1952. United King-
dom Public Records Office. FO 371/102548, Jacket WU 1692/56.
74. A document could be designated COSMIC TOP SECRET, COSMIC SECRET, and
so on.
75. NATO, Security System for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels:
NATO Archives. December 1, 1949. DC 2/1: App. B, § 12. Typically, the British called
these "cosmicized" personnel.
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cumbrous."'76 Acknowledging the difficulty, the Standing Group proposed
an amendment "in order that the operations on non-military bodies ...
shall not be needlessly restricted. ' 77 Approved in May 1950, the amend-
ment narrowed the definition of COSMIC documents. The COSMIC mark-
ing would not apply to documents that did not refer to military defense
planning, or which "by their nature of their content... require wide distri-
bution for necessary action within Government ministries and depart-
ments."'78 Instead, these documents would be given a new NATO marking,
in addition to a security grading.
This amendment made the COSMIC system more manageable, but cre-
ated a new problem: the SOI policy provided no guidance on the handling
of NATO-marked material. In 1951, the Standing Group suggested that
civilian arms of NATO might each develop their own security regulations,
but this proposal was not pursued. 79 An overhauled SOI policy adopted in
March 1952 provided more detailed guidance on COSMIC procedures but
said little about documents with the NATO marking. NATO documents,
the policy said, should "receive the same care and handling as laid down
for national classified material in each nation's own security
regulations. "80
This proved unsatisfactory to the Standing Group. By July 1953, fol-
lowing discussions with military staff in the member states, it had decided
that further reform of the SOI policy was essential. 8 l Although the Coun-
cil had by now established a larger and more representative Security Com-
mittee, the Standing Group took the initiative to draft the proposed new
policy. Delivered to the Security Committee in August 1954, the draft out-
lined the rationale for further changes:
76. North Atlantic Council, Verbatim record of the second meeting of the fourth
session of the North Atlantic Council. Brussels: NATO Archives. May 15, 1950. R.4/
2(V): 25.
77. NATO Standing Group, Report by the Standing Group to the Military Committee
on Security System for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO Archives.
March 20, 1950. MC 9/2: § 1-2.
78. NATO Standing Group, Report by the Standing Group to the Military Committee
on Security System for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO Archives.
March 20, 1950. MC 9/2: App. A.
79. NATO Standing Group. Report by the Security Coordinating Committee to the
Standing Group on Proposed Further Amendments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation Security System. Brussels: NATO Archives. August 3, 1951. SG 7/43: 3.
80. NATO, Revision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security System, as
approved by Council Deputies. Brussels: NATO Archives. March 19, 1952. DC 2/7
(Final): 2.
81. A Security Committee memorandum of July 7, 1953 notes that the Standing
Group has proposed revision of DC 2/7. See NATO Security Committee, Topics for Dis-
cussion at Joint Meeting with NATO Security Committee. Brussels: NATO Archives. July
7, 1953. AC/35-D/12. A memorandum of August 23, 1954 explains that the revision
follows "discussions between the Standing Group Security Committee and the security
authorities of military formations during a recent tour of inspection." Memorandum by
the Security Bureau on Revision of DC 2/7. Brussels: NATO Archives. August 23, 1954.
AC/35-WP/2.
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The expansion of NATO now requires the wide dissemination of a vast
amount of classified information, the bulk of which does not merit ... the
special protection of the COSMIC system. It is desirable, however, that this
lower graded information should be given standardized protection according
to its degree of secrecy, so that each member nation may be assured that any
information which it contributes is being given the protection which secur-
ity requires.
82
The draft proposed to limit the COSMIC system to TOP SECRET infor-
mation, while introducing new requirements for handling all remaining
NATO information. However, the draft went further, suggesting the need
to assure adequate security for any sensitive information held by member
states, even if it had not been distributed through the NATO apparatus:
In addition, it is desirable that all NATO nations should agree to conform to
basic principles and standards for the protection of all information, both
national and international, the unauthorized disclosure of which would
endanger the security of present NATO planning.8 3
The Standing Group withdrew its draft policy in September 1954,
after "military sources" expressed a desire for further modifications.8 4 The
Standing Group produced a second draft in December 1954,85 but within
weeks military representatives made further recommendations for
strengthening the policy.
8 6
The NATO Security Committee began a five-day review of the pro-
posed policy in January 1955. By this time, there was significant pressure
to adopt a revised policy quickly. In August 1954, the U.S. Congress had
loosened statutory restrictions on the dissemination of information about
nuclear weapons programs. 8 7 Soon after, the U.S. government told its allies
that it was prepared to sign an agreement on the sharing of atomic informa-
tion at the NATO ministerial meeting planned for March 1955-but only
on the condition that the revised SOI policy was adopted by the Council at
the same meeting.8 8
82. NATO Security Committee, Memorandum by the Security Bureau on Revision of
DC 2/7. Brussels: NATO Archives. August 23, 1954. AC/35-WP/2: 4.
83. NATO Security Committee, Memorandum by the Security Bureau on Revision of
DC 2/7. Brussels: NATO Archives. August 23, 1954. AC/35-WIP/2: 5. Emphasis in
original.
84. NATO Security Committee, Note by the Secretary of the NATO Security Commit-
tee. Brussels: NATO Archives. September 6, 1954. AC/35-N/5.
85. NATO Standing Group, Report on Security within the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Brussels: NATO Archives. December 10, 1954. SG 7/65.
86. NATO Security Committee, Note by Security Bureau on revision of DC 2/7. Brus-
sels: NATO Archives. January 21, 1955. AC/35-WP/4.
87. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 overturned wartime agreements between the
U.S. and major allies by blocking the transfer of information about nuclear weapons
development to other nations. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 loosened some of these
restrictions.
88. North Atlantic Council, Summary record of meeting of the Council on December
6, 1954. Brussels: NATO Archives. December 6, 1954. C-R(54)46: 1; North Atlantic
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As a result, there was little room to explore the implications of the new
policy. At the Security Committee's January meeting, several countries
expressed concern about the breadth of the new policy:
The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE stated that his Government experienced
some hesitation in approving Enclosure "B" as it stood since some provi-
sions seemed to go further than laying down basic principles and minimum
standards of security .... Enclosure "B" might be interpreted as applying to
national as well as NATO information. There still existed a wide field of
classified national information the security of which was a national respon-
sibility....
The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE supported the view expressed by the
Danish Representative, stating that... Enclosure "B" should be regarded as a
set of guiding principles rather than regulations which were binding on all
governments.
The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE sympathised with this view and envisaged
difficulties of a constitutional nature if some margin of latitude was not
provided.89
The Committee responded with a minor amendment to the section's
preface that conceded that the basic principles and standards could be
applied "in an appropriate manner" by national governments. Otherwise
the scope and content of the section was not significantly changed.
Controversy over centralization. The mandate of the Security Bureau
was also questioned during the 1954-55 overhaul of NATO's SO policy.
The Standing Group's August 1954 draft provided that the Security Bureau
would be responsible for "periodic inspection of security arrangements for
the protection of North Atlantic Treaty defense information within interna-
tional and national civil organizations." 90 This affirmed existing practice.
However, the Standing Group's December redraft was more ambitious. The
reference to NATO information was removed, and the Security Bureau was
given a broad mandate to undertake "periodical examinations of the secur-
ity system in national and international civil agencies." 9' This proved too
expansive, and the final revision struck a middle ground. The Bureau
could carry out "periodic examinations of the security arrangements for
the protection of NATO classified information and material in national and
NATO civil agencies." 9 2
The Canadian government continued to express concern about the
degree of centralization implied in the proposal, and asked for assurance
that the policy was not intended to give the NATO Security Bureau "any
89. NATO Security Committee, Summary record of NATO Security Committee Meet-
ing, January 24-28, 1955. Brussels: NATO Archives. February 8, 1955. AC/35-R/11: 1.
90. NATO Security Committee, Memorandum by the Security Bureau on Revision of
DC 2/7. Brussels: NATO Archives. August 23, 1954. AC/35-WP/2: Encl. C, § 1.3.a.
91. NATO Standing Group, Report on Security within the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Brussels: NATO Archives. December 10, 1954. SG 7/65: Enc. C, § 1.3.f.
92. NATO Security Bureau. Note on revision of the NATO security system. Brussels:
NATO Archives. February 1, 1955. AC/35-D/86: 3.
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executive or other authority within national systems."93 The assurance was
provided. However, the British government countered with a proposal that
the Security Bureau should have a mandate to give advice on the applica-
tion of the basic principles and minimum standards of security.9 4 The
Council approved this mandate and quickly invoked it. In August 1955,
NATO appointed an advisor to the West German government, whose acces-
sion to NATO had recently been approved, to provide guidance "in setting
up an overall security system" that would safeguard national information
as well as NATO documents.95
Controversy over depth of NATO policy. Concerns about the depth of
the new policy-that is, the extent to which captured less sensitive informa-
tion within classification rules-were also aired but defeated. Two govern-
ments, Norway and Denmark, joined in a proposal to simplify the
classification system by eliminating the RESTRICTED grading. 96 The Nor-
wegian government "felt that this grading was superfluous, and that its
definition as well as the rules governing the safeguarding of document so
graded were so vague that they might lead to confusion instead of contrib-
uting to overall NATO security." Most other nations disagreed, and "for the
sake of unity," Norway withdrew its proposal. 9 7
The concerns expressed by Norway and Denmark echoed those made
by American journalists five years earlier. The RESTRICTED grading had
been an element of U.S. classification policy since the first executive order
on classification in 1940.98 In 1950, it became the subject of controversy,
when President Truman issued a new executive order giving civilian agen-
cies the authority to classify documents for the first time. The vagueness of
the RESTRICTED grading reinforced fears that the order would give offi-
cials "vast discretion" over the release of information. 99 Despite a year of
protests by editors and journalists, the order went into effect in October
1951. However, in November 1953, the Eisenhower administration
reversed course and eliminated the RESTRICTED grading in U.S. policy. 100
93. Canada, Memorandum to Council from Canadian Government on Proposed
Security Regulations. Brussels: NATO Archives. February 24, 1955. C-M(55)25); NATO
Secretary General, Note by the Secretary General and Vice-Chairman of the Council on
Security Procedures for the Protection of NATO Classified Information. Brussels: NATO
Archives. March 8, 1955. C-M(55)15(Final).
94. United Kingdom, Memorandum from United Kingdom to Council on Reform of
Security Regulations. Brussels: NATO Archives. February 18, 1955. C-M(55)22.
95. NATO Standing Group, Memorandum for the Secretary, Standing Group: New
NATO Security Adviser in Germany. Brussels: NATO Archives. August 23, 1955. LOM
57/55: 3.
96. NATO Security Committee, Summary record of NATO Security Committee Meet-
ing, January 24-28, 1955. Brussels: NATO Archives. February 8, 1955. AC/35-R/11.
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98. See ARVIN QUIST, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION. Oak Ridge, Tennessee:
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. September 1989: Chapter 3.
99. See Kathleen Endres, National Security Benchmark: Truman, Executive Order
10290, and the Press, 67.4 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY, Winter 1990, at 1071, 1073.
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Unfortunately, it was impossible for U.S. editors and journalists to
mount a similar protest against the broad classification standards in the
NATO policy, which was itself a RESTRICTED document at that time, and
therefore inaccessible. In October 1957, the Danish government again pro-
posed a simplification of the grading system, which it believed encouraged
over-classification.1 0 1 Again, a majority of other countries vetoed the pro-
posal. The record of the July 1958 meeting of the Security Committee at
which the Danish proposal was rejected is still withheld by NATO. 10 2
Personnel controls. The Standing Group's 1954 draft of a new SOI pol-
icy also proposed tougher rules for personnel handling sensitive informa-
tion. For the first time, NATO policy would affirm the need for "positive
vetting," a practice of active background investigations intended to uncover
evidence of disloyalty or improper affiliations, or character defects that
might make an individual susceptible to improper influences. 10 3 Positive
vetting was central to the "loyalty program" for American government
employees introduced by the Truman administration in 1947, and strength-
ened by the Eisenhower administration in November 1953.104
For several years the British government had resisted the American sys-
tem of positive vetting. Many British policymakers found American meth-
ods "repugnant"' 0 5 and doubted their effectiveness.' 0 6 In 1948, the
British government had adopted a more restrained system of "negative vet-
ting," consisting only of a check against security service files for evidence
of inappropriate political affiliations.
Positive vetting was not included in early versions of NATO SOl policy
due to this disagreement between the U.S. and the United Kingdom. The
January 1950 version of the SOl policy, DC 2/1, suggested only that "posi-
tive inquiries" might be necessary for some of the most sensitive positions
in government.10 7 Its March 1952 successor, DC 2/7, did not discuss per-
101. NATO Security Committee, Summary record of meeting of the NATO Security
Committee. Brussels: NATO Archives. October 17-18, 1957. AC/35-R/22; Denmark,
Memorandum to the NATO Security Committee on Controlling and Reducing the Vol-
ume of Classified Information and Documents. Brussels: NATO Archives. January 11,
1958. AC/35-D/226.
102. The withheld document is NATO AC/35-R/23, the summary record of the meet-
ing of the NATO Security Committee held on July 16-17, 1958. A working group on the
control of the volume of classified documents in NATO agencies had earlier reported
that a majority of its members opposed the Danish proposal. See Note by Chairman of
the Working Group on the control of classified documents in NATO agencies. Brussels:
NATO Archives. January 13, 1958. AC/35-WP/13.
103. NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO
Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Encl. B, § 9 and 15.
104. See M.R. Joelson, The Dismissal of Civil Servants in the Interests of National Secur-
ity, PUB. L. 51, 60-65 (1963).
105. PETER HENNESSY, THE SECRET STATE at 93 (202).
106. See MARGARET GOWING, INDEPENDENCE AND DETERRENCE: BRITAIN AND ATOMIC
ENERGY, 1945-1952 at 305 (1974); RICHARD ALDRICH, THE HIDDEN HAND: BRITAIN,
AMERICA AND COLD WAR SECRET INTELLIGENCE 384 (2001).
107. NATO, Security System for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels:
NATO Archives. December 1, 1949. DC 2/1: App. B, 91 13.
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sonnel clearance procedures at all. 10 8
However, the British did not protest the incorporation of positive vet-
ting requirements in C-M(55)15(Final). The Truman and Eisenhower
administrations, pressured by powerful isolationist elements in Congress,
made clear that they could not reestablish the practice of sharing of atomic
information unless the British adopted the positive vetting system. Also
pressured by its own military leaders, the British Cabinet relented and
adopted the American procedures.109 The Eisenhower administration
reciprocated by proposing reforms to the Atomic Energy Act in February
1954 to facilitate the sharing of atomic information. 11 0
In late 1955, the British government publicly affirmed its new com-
mitment to the practice of positive vetting. It conceded that the new mea-
sures were "alien to our traditional practices" but insisted on the necessity
of "tilting the balance in favour of offering greater protection to the security
of the State rather than in the direction of safeguarding the rights of the
individual." 1 I
Penalties for unauthorized disclosure. The security policy adopted by
the Council in March 1955 made clear that "disciplinary action" was to be
taken "against any individual who is responsible for the compromise of
NATO classified information."' 12 No comparable provision was included
in earlier policies. However, a series of substantial leaks in 1952 and 1953
demonstrated the need for firmer rules, and resulted in increased pressure
on member states to adopt criminal penalties for unauthorized release of
NATO information.' 13
108. NATO, Revision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security System, as
approved by Council Deputies. Brussels: NATO Archives. March 19, 1952. DC 2/7
(Final): Annex B, c 13.
109. On the evolution of British policy, and American pressure to adopt positive vet-
ting, see MARGARET GOwING, INDEPENDENCE AND DETERRENCE: BRITAIN AND ATOMIC ENERGY,
1945-1952 (1974); RICHARD ALDRICH, THE HIDDEN HAND: BRITAIN, AMERICA AND COLD
WAR SECRET INTELLIGENCE (2001). An advisor to Prime Minister Attlee observed: "We
want the American Atomic secrets and we won't get them unless they modify the McMa-
hon Act. Officials have already offered the procedure now proposed [positive vetting]
and nothing short of that offer - and the direct question to the candidate about Commu-
nist association is from the Americans' point of view a sine qua non - will secure their
cooperation": RICHARD ALDRICH, THE HIDDiEN HAND: BRITAIN, AMIERICA AND COLD WAR
SFECRET INTELLIGENCE 425 (2001).
110. See Eisenhower, Dwight D. (1954). Special message to the Congress recom-
mending amendments to the Atomic Energy Act. Washington, DC: Executive Office of
the President. February 17, 1954.
111. White Paper on Security Precautions in the British Civil Service. 35 PUB. ADMIN.
297, 297-304 (Autumn 1957); DAVID VINCENT, THE CULTURE OF SECRECY IN BRITAIN, 1832-
1998 at 203 (1998). The Canadian government, which also participated in a collabora-
tive atomic program with the UK and US during the war, was in a similar predicament
and adopted the positive vetting system before 1950.
112. NATO, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO
Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Encl. C, Sect IX.10.
113. Concern over leaks in 1952-53 is discussed in United Kingdom Foreign Office
records from this period. See, e.g., Memorandum from United Kingdom Permanent Del-
egation to Foreign Office. March 13, 1953. United Kingdom Public Records Office. FO
371/108059.
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Frustration with leaks peaked after a meeting of the Council in April
1953.1 14 The main aim of the meeting was the resolution of the sensitive
issue of how much each nation would contribute toward a £250 million
defense infrastructure program. The New York Times published details of
the proposed plan two weeks before the meeting.1 15 A week later, the
Times, London's Daily Telegraph, and the Associated Press simultaneously
published details of NATO's plans for production of fighter aircraft. Mat-
ters deteriorated during the meeting when Le Monde reproduced the
agenda and provided a running summary of the talks, while the Times sum-
marized American and British background reports on relations with the
Soviet Union.' 16 Major press services transmitted the final communique
hours before the NATO secretariat formally released it. Later, the Times
excerpted a secret paper on Soviet-Chinese relations discussed at the
meeting. ' '
7
In May 1953, Secretary General Ismay told the Council that leaks such
as these posed a "grave threat" to NATO's effectiveness. The NATO Council
directed the Security Committee to study "the extent to which each mem-
ber government could take legal action in respect of leakages of NATO clas-
sified information . .. [and] report to the Council as soon as possible with
regard to any practical steps that could be taken to ensure that leakages of
NATO classified information would not occur in future."'" 8
The Security Committee made a ten-month study of state secrets laws
and reported to Council in March 1954. Only three countries-France,
Italy, and Turkey-had clear criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclo-
sure of NATO classified information. (In fact, France recently had modi-
fied its law to address this issue, perhaps in response to the leaks
controversy.' 19) Many countries were found to have state secrets laws that
were deficient or ambiguously worded. Two of these countries, Belgium
and the Netherlands, reported that they were contemplating amendments
to address problems with their state secrets laws. The Security Committee
recommended that governments consider "suitable supplementary legisla-
114. This summary of leaks relating to the meeting is drawn from North Atlantic
Council, Summary record of meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Brussels: NATO
Archives. May 6, 1953. C-R(53)25: 9. The final communique for the April 1953 meeting
can be found at LORD lSMAY, NATO: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 195-97 (1955). A former
chairman of the NATO Military Committee observed that negotiations over infrastruc-
ture programs were "a highly contentious and time-consuming process." SIR PETIR Hii-L-
NORTON, No SOFT OPTIONS: THE POITICO-MILITARY REALIES OF NATO 114 (1978).
115. See Benjamin Welles, NATO Experts Urge 3-Year Joint Plan on Defense Costs, N.Y.
TImiFs, April 15, 1953, at 1.
116. See CL. Sulzberger, NATO Council Opens Vital Session Today, N.Y. TIMES, April
23, 1953, at 1.
117. See C.L. Sulzberger, China-Soviet Ties Scanned by NATO, N.Y. TIMES, April 27,
1953, at 7.
118. North Atlantic Council, Summary record of meeting of the North Atlantic Coun-
cil. Brussels: NATO Archives. May 6, 1953. C-R(53)25: 6-7.
119. Decret 52-813 of July 11, 1952 amended French law to criminalize the unautho-
rized disclosure of NATO information. Similar provisions were incorporated into the
French Penal Code in 1960, through Ordonnance 60-529 of June 4, 1960. Correspon-
dence from Mr. Herve Halimi, University of Paris (November 28, 2002).
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tion" to ensure that there would be criminal sanctions for leaking NATO
information.' 20 The Council endorsed the recommendation.' 2'
In August 1954, the Standing Group considered the problem of leaks.
Its draft overhaul of the NATO security policy included a new section dedi-
cated to the problem of "leakages of information to the press."' 2 2 It pro-
posed that national security authorities should have the duty to
immediately investigate leaks and take "disciplinary action" against
leakers. The Standing Group later added another proposal, giving the
NATO Security Bureau the authority to coordinate with national authorities
on leak investigations. 12 3 Comparable rules are found in the final version
of the policy adopted by the Council in March 1955.
The subject did not rest there. The chairman of the Security Commit-
tee, apparently dismayed by governments' response to the Committee's
1954 recommendation on reform of national laws, returned to the subject
in a January 1956 meeting. "To make the position quite clear," the chair-
man said, governments were to answer five questions about their state
secrets laws:
(1) Is a NATO secret considered to be a "State secret"?
(2) Can any person guilty of disclosing a "State secret" be prosecuted
whether he be a member of the Government, an official or a private citizen?
(3) Is the charge the same for a person who intentionally discloses a secret
and for one who does so by negligence?
(4) Can a person who discloses a "State secret" or a NATO secret be prose-
cuted in a country when the offence has been committed outside that
country?
(5) Can a country prosecute a foreigner who has disclosed a NATO secret
on its territory? 1
24
Most countries answered that their national legislation provided ade-
quate protection. Denmark responded that its law had been modified in
April 1955 to address these issues, while Belgium said that statutory
changes had been introduced in April 1956. The Greek government also
reported that "necessary steps to revise legislation to cover all possible
cases" were being taken.1
25
120. NATO Security Committee, Report by the Chairman of the NATO Security Com-
mittee on leakages of classified information. Brussels: NATO Archives. March 19, 1954.
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sels: NATO Archives. January 21, 1955. AC/35-WP/4: 3.
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Ironically, in the United States, sanctions for unauthorized disclosure
of classified information remained weak. Congress refused to enact crimi-
nal penalties except in narrowly defined circumstances, such as the disclo-
sure of atomic information or deliberate disclosure to foreign agents. 126
The American representative to NATO conceded the inadequacy of these
measures in his report to the Security Committee. 127 In March 1955, the
Department of Justice told Congress that it had broader penalties under
"active consideration." ' 28 A bipartisan commission on government secur-
ity established in August 1955 recommended wider criminal sanctions, 1 29
but Congress again failed to act.
III. Evidence of Continuing Influence
The tension between domestic policies on access to information and inter-
governmental obligations continues to be evident among NATO's older
member states. One critical conflict concerns the treatment of information
received from other governments, or intergovernmental organizations such
as NATO, under domestic access-to-information laws. Adopted after the
establishment of the NATO security regime, these laws have been drafted to
accommodate the principle of originator control that is entrenched in
NATO SOI policy. Governments have resisted calls for loosening this rule
in national access-to-information laws, but have rarely acknowledged that
national policy is constrained by intergovernmental commitments. Conse-
quently, many domestic policy actors continue under the misapprehension
that the content of national policy can be decided in national fora.
Canada. Debate over Canada's Access to Information Act (ATIA) illus-
trates the problem. The law obliges the Canadian government to deny any
request for access to information provided in confidence by other states or
international organizations of states unless the originator consents to its
release. ' 30 In 1987, a parliamentary committee recommended that the law
be amended to give the government discretion to release such information
when disclosure seemed unlikely to cause harm. 131 Canada's Information
126. See Harold Edgar & Benno Schmidtjr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of
Defense Information. 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973); Paul Hoffman & Kate Martin, Safe-
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127. NATO Security Committee, Report by the Chairman of the NATO Security Com-
mittee on leakages of classified information. Brussels: NATO Archives. March 19, 1954.
C-M(54)21: 5.
128. See Subcommittee on Reorganization. Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Reorganization of the Senate Committee on Government Operations on SJ. Res. 21,
Joint Resolution to Establish a Commission on Government Security, March 8-18, 1955.
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office: 69.
129. See Commission on Government Security. Report. Washington, DC: Govern-
ment Printing Office. June 23, 1957: 619-620.
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131. See STANDING COMM. ON JUST. & SoLic. GEN., OPEN AND SHUT: ENHANCING THE
RIGHT TO KNOX' AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY (1987). Under the proposal, states or inter-
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Commissioner later gave qualified support to the proposal. 132
The Canadian government has consistently resisted these proposals.
In 1987, it argued that weakening the originator control rule would impair
"[tihe willingness of other governments to continue to share their informa-
tion." ' 33 More recently, it has said that any reform would "set Canada
apart from its key allies."13 4 This may be an indirect way of making clear
the fundamental problem: that reform of this part of the ATIA would create
a conflict between national law and Canada's obligations under the North
Atlantic Treaty. Canada cannot explicitly acknowledge the potential con-
flict, because this would constitute a non-consensual disclosure of the sub-
stance of NATO's security policy. As a result, many Canadians continue to
believe that reform is a matter that can be settled on the merits by domestic
actors.
United Kingdom. The same misapprehension may prevail in other
jurisdictions. In 1999, the British government was criticized for incorpo-
rating the originator control rule in its draft Freedom of Information
Act. 135 The Campaign for Freedom of Information, a non-governmental
organization, described this as an "indiscriminate" exemption that would
allow the withholding of "harmless information." 13 6 Parliamentarians
attempted to have the provision amended, but the government opposed
these proposals on the grounds that they would violate a universally recog-
nized norm of confidentiality. 137 It failed to explain that the government
was constrained by more than convention: such an amendment would cre-
ate a conflict between statutory and intergovernmental obligations. Simi-
lar complaints were made against a comparable provision in the new
Scottish Freedom of Information Act.' 38 However, the Scottish govern-
ment was explicitly constrained by the agreement governing the delegation
of power to Scotland from the United Kingdom, which required Scotland to
respect the terms of C-M(55)15(Final). 139
governmental organizations would have been given notice and an opportunity to make a
case against release of information.
132. Information Commissioner of Canada. Annual Report 1993-1994. Ottawa:
Office of the Information Commissioner. June 1994: 15. A private member's bill intro-
duced in 1999 would have adopted this approach for records more than thirty years old.
See section 8 of An Act to amend the Access to Information Act, Bill C-206, 36th Parl., 2d
Session.
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work for Canadians. Ottawa: Treasury Board Secretariat. June 12, 2002: 51.
135. The originator control rule is preserved in section 27(3) of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act 2000.
136. See Campaign for Freedom of Information. Briefing for MPs for the Report Stage
debate on the Freedom of Information Bill. London: Campaign for Freedom of Informa-
tion. April 4, 2000.
137. See House of Lords, Hansard. London: House of Lords. November 14, 2000. Vol.
61.9, Part 166.
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United States. In the United States, debate about the degree of protec-
tion to be given to information provided by foreign governments was
stirred by the 1998 case of Weatherhead v. United States. 1 40 At the center of
that case was the question of whether the judiciary should be permitted to
consider the reasonableness of the U.S. government's decision to withhold
a communication from the British government. Advocates for trans-
parency argued in favor of the court's power to intervene, saying that it was
indefensible in an open society to support a policy of absolute secrecy for
inter-governmental communications, and that foreign governments could
not reasonably expect total secrecy. 141
The case did not involve NATO communications, however, the trans-
parency advocates' case was probably overstated. As the NATO policy
shows, there are clearly domains where other governments do have a rea-
sonable expectation of complete secrecy, based on the existence of an SO
agreement. Furthermore, the capacity of the judiciary to intervene and
impose the right balance on questions of disclosure is exaggerated. The
effect of NATO's SOI policy is to deny domestic actors, including the
courts, the opportunity to make their own decisions about the disclosure
of information within a certain policy domain. 14 2
Sweden. Some governments have been more candid about the con-
straints that intergovernmental SOI agreements impose on national policy.
Sweden has a long tradition of governmental openness that clashes sharply
with the demands of the originator control rule. At the same time, Sweden
wishes to engage with the international community, and thus must try to
reconcile national practices with international norms.
The tension is evident in the SOI agreement between the WEU and
Sweden signed in March 1997. A declaration by the Swedish government
annexed to the agreement attempts to maintain the form of national policy
while conforming to international norms. Sweden asserts the right to
make its own decisions about disclosure of WEU documents, but observes
that national law permits it to withhold information if disclosure would
"disturb international relations." It then recognizes that any disclosure of
WEU information without consent would "disturb relations" with the
WEU. 143 In effect, Sweden acknowledges its willingness to give the WEU a
veto on disclosure, although the decision will be cloaked in the form of a
calculation by national policymakers about the substantive harm likely to
be caused by the release of WEU documents.
140. See Weatherhead v. United States, 157 F.3d 735 (9th Cir. 1998).
141. See Center for National Security Studies, National Security Archive, Federation
of American Scientists, et al. Amici Curiae briefing in the case of United States v.
Weatherhead. Washington: Federation of American Scientists. November 19, 1999: § 4.
142. The content of transparency policy in the national security field is also treated as
a purely domestic matter in Kate Doyle, The End of Secrecy: U.S. National Security and the
New Openness Movement, in NATIONAL INSECURITY: U.S. INTELLI GENCE AFTER THE COLD
WAR 92, 112 (C. Eisendrath ed., 2000).
143. See Sweden, Security Agreement between Sweden and Western European Union.
Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs. March 18, 1997.
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European Union. The position of the European Union also provides a
clear demonstration of the influence of NATO policy. On July 26, 2000,
the Council of the European Union approved substantial restrictions to its
policy on public access to Council documents. The amendments elimi-
nated the public's right of access to almost all classified information1 4 4
and permitted the release of other documents containing sensitive informa-
tion about member states only with their consent. The Council's decision
explained that the EU's expansion into the field of defense policy would
require the exchange of "particularly sensitive" information, and that this
could be accomplished "only if the originator of such information can be
confident that no information put out by him will be disclosed against his
will."1 45 Many observers were shocked by the decision. They did not
know that on the same day the Secretary General of the Council had
entered into an interim security agreement with NATO that incorporated
the key elements of C-M(55)15(Final).1 46
The spirit of the July 2000 amendments is continued in a new regula-
tion governing access to information held by EU institutions adopted in
May 2001. Under the new regulation, national governments and bodies
like NATO retain the right to block the disclosure of classified information
relating to public security or defense which they have provided to EU insti-
tutions. The classification policy of the originating institution, rather than
that of the EU, will determine whether documents are subject to the rule of
originator control. 14 7  These arrangements proved highly unpopular
among advocates of transparency but were clearly consistent with NATO
requirements.
The impact of EU-NATO cooperation expanded in March 2001, when
new security regulations governing EU classified information were
approved by the Council. The regulations replicate NATO and WEU SOI
rules. The span of these regulations is not limited to EU institutions: mem-
ber states also have an obligation to adopt appropriate national measures
to ensure that the Council's rules on the handling of classified information
are respected within their governments.' 4 8 This imposes another con-
144. RESTRICTED information was not included in this change.
145. See Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2000/527/EC, amending
Decision 93/731/EC on public access to Council documents. Brussels: Council of the
European Union. August 14, 2000.
146. The agreement was contained in an exchange of letters between Lord Robertson,
Secretary General of NATO, and Javier Solana, Secretary General of the Council of the
European Union. The identifying number of the NATO policy (that is, C-
M(55)15(Final)) was redacted in the publicly accessible version of the correspondence.
See Letter from Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, to Javier Solana, Secretary
General of the Council of the European Union on NATO-EU Interim Security Agree-
ments. July 26, 2000. Available from the Secretariat of the Council of the European
Union.
147. See Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament,
Council and Commission documents. Brussels: European Union. May 30, 2001: Art. 9.
148. See Council of the European Union. Council Decision 2001/264/EC adopting
Council's Security Regulations. Brussels: Council of the European Union. March 19,
2001: Preamble and Art. 2. The European Parliament has challenged the security regula-
tions before the European Court of Justice. The European Commission also adopted the
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straint on the transparency policies of the fifteen EU member states, and
will soon apply to the policies of the thirteen states that have applied for
accession to the EU. The Council has also prepared a draft decision that
would compel member states to adopt consistent criminal penalties for the
unauthorized disclosure of EU classified information. 149
CHART ONE: PARTIES TO MULTILATERAL SECURITY OF
INFORMATION (SOI) ARRANGEMENTS IN EUROPE
Member states of WEU and NATO are bound by multilateral security agreements
and EU member states are bound by the requirements of Council decision 2001/
264/EC. All three multilateral institutions are also bound together by security
agreements: NATO and WEU in 1992; EU and WEU in 1999; EU and NATO in
2000 (interim agreement). ISO country codes are used. Candidate countries are
not included
Conclusion: A Thickening Web of Secrecy Rules
The prevailing sentiment among advocates of transparency is that
processes of globalization and intergovernmental collaboration help to pro-
mote greater governmental openness. "For nation-states," Ann Florini
observed in 1998, "the shift is occurring between old ideas of sovereignty,
same security regulations on November 29, 2001: Decision 2001/844/EC, ECSC,
Euratom.
149. See Council of the European Union. Information Note from General Secretariat
to COREPER on organizational and implementing measures in the General Secretariat of
the Council. Brussels: General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. Novem-
ber 22, 2000. 13708/00: 1.
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which allowed states to keep the world out of their domestic matters, and a
new standard that they must explain their actions to the world."'150
Thomas Blanton argued in 2002 that "more often than not, supranational
organizations create a demand for greater access to information, both
between and within countries.' 5 '
These assessments may underestimate the potential hazards of certain
kinds of global integration. As Chart One shows, nations within Europe
are subject to an increasingly dense web of intergovernmental arrange-
ments that constrain the use and distribution of information by national
governments. The United Kingdom, for example, is bound by SOI agree-
ments with NATO and the WEU, and by the recent EU decision on classi-
fied information; these three intergovernmental organizations are
themselves bound to one another by SOI agreements. This may facilitate
the flow of information among states and intergovernmental organizations,
but it does so at a price. It entrenches rules that strictly limit the flow of
information to non-governmental parties, and even within the administra-
tive arms of governments themselves. In this context, "old ideas of sover-
eignty"-at least insofar as control of information is concerned-have been
strongly affirmed.
This web of SO1 arrangements has dimensions which, although impor-
tant, are not addressed in this paper. Governments have also negotiated
innumerable bilateral 501 agreements that constrain national policies. In
some instances, the content of these agreements is classified; in other
cases, the very existence of the agreement is kept secret. Some bilateral
agreements may explicitly adopt NATO standards to govern the handling of
all sensitive information exchanged by the signatories. The United States
acknowledges that it has negotiated at least fifty-three such agreements. 152
Its agreement with Britain, signed in 1961 and only declassified in 2001,
incorporates NATO standards, as does its agreement with Canada, signed
in 1962 but only declassified in 2002.153 The influence of NATO rules is
also extended by their explicit incorporation in SOI agreements between
national and sub-national governments t 5 4 and between national govern-
ments, industry and the educational sector. 15 5
150. See Ann Florini, The End of Secrecy, II1 FOREIGN POC'Y 50, 50-63 (Summer
1998).
151. See Thomas Blanton, The World's Right to Know, FOREIGN POLY 50, 56 (July/
August 2002).
152. The Office of the Secretary of Defense provided this information in September
2002, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request submitted by the author.
153. The US-UK General Security of Information Agreement was declassified and
released by the UK Ministry of Defence in March 2001 following a parliamentary ques-
tion by Mr. Robert Key, MP. The US-Canada Security of Information Agreement was
declassified and released in November 2002 response to an Access to Information Act
request by the author.
154. The agreement between the United Kingdom and Scotland, noted earlier, is an
illustration. A comparable agreement was also made with the Government of Wales.
155. In fact, C-M(55)15(Final) says explicitly that standards for the protection of clas-
sified information entrusted to industry and universities should be consistent with the
standards and principles which it prescribes. See NATO, Security within the North
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This transnational web of SOI agreements diffuses values that conflict
sharply with those promoted by advocates of transparency. The fact that
these agreements exist and are increasingly interconnected with one
another also makes the work of transparency advocates much more diffi-
cult. The problem is not just that reform of domestic policy may be con-
strained by a specific intergovernmental SOI agreement. The reform of one
SO agreement may also require modifications to other agreements that are
linked and built on similar principles. 15 6
In fact, it is conceivable that the thickening web of SOl agreements
could actually strengthen incentives for governments to tighten security
practices. The connection of governmental networks means that the flow
of information through any one government will be increased. It follows
that the amount of information that could be improperly diverted at any
point is also increased. To adapt a metaphor, the entire network becomes
as porous as its weakest node. Bigger networks are necessarily more prone
to compromise.
Internal documents recently prepared by Canadian security and intel-
ligence officials highlight another difficulty. Since the end of the Cold
War, Canada is said to have developed "more bilateral intelligence relation-
ships, and arguably, a more complex set of sensitivities regarding the pro-
tection of information provided in confidence." In some intelligence
analyses, the officials note, it is now "impossible to distinguish informa-
tion that may have originated from Allies." The commingling of domestic-
and foreign-sourced information makes it harder to apply Canadian right-
to-information law, which applies distinct disclosure rules to the two kinds
of data. The proposed response was to rely exclusively on the more restric-
tive rule-that is, the rule for foreign-sourced information-in cases where
commingling had occurred. 157
Of course, rules to preserve security of information are essential.
However, these rules must be suited to the realities of the time, including
the nature of the perceived security threat and the expectations of citizens
about access to information. This fact has always been obvious to govern-
ments, who have debated the contours of SO policy behind closed doors
for decades. In a world in which security threats and citizen expectations
have changed radically, it is no longer acceptable to conduct the debate
Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brussels: NATO Archives. Reissued July 31, 1964. C-
M(55)15(Final)(Ed 1964): Encl. B, § 20.
156. This web of Sol agreements may also create administrative difficulties for gov-
ernments, by restricting the flow of information even among departments and agencies.
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Annual Training Seminar. Washington, DC: Information Security Oversight Office. July
16, 2002.
157. The proposed response was to eliminate the obligation to separate or "sever"
information in cases where such commingling had occurred. The memoranda were pre-
pared by the Security and Intelligence Secretariat of the Privy Council Office in April
and May 2001, and released to the author in July 2002 in response to Access to Informa-
tion Act request. The proposed response was included in a draft report of the govern-
ment's Access to Information Act Review Task Force, released in response to the same
request.
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over SOI rules in this way. It is time for the debate about So rules to be
democratized. An appropriate first step would be for NATO, like other
multilateral institutions, to recognize the need for greater transparency,
and explain more fully what expectations it imposes on its member states.
